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Field reports and the relevant research literature indicate that, despite international
support efforts, transition economy countries are often unable to ensure sustainable
growth in political, economic and social development due to inadequate “governance.”
The manifestations of inadequate governance noted in the literature include, e.g., a lack
of administrative coordination and consultation mechanisms, deficient administrative
law and procedures, and absence of public management competencies, among others.
As stated by Drechsler (2004), “Governance” as such is a neutral concept that
focuses on the steering mechanisms for the management and operation of a certain
political unit, emphasizing the interaction of State (first), Business (second) and
Society (third sector) players (Drechsler 2004).
However, the use of the notion of “governance” remains an ill-defined concept.
Farazmand (2004) lists the most often mentioned concepts of governance or
government used during the last two decades as follows:
Good governance, entrepreneurial government, competitive government,
market-like governance, economic governance, social and political governance,
enabling governance, participatory governance, regulatory governance, inter-
ventionist governance or government, steering government versus rowing
government, and the like (p. 3)
This is even truer for the notion of “good governance,” which is often used by the
World Bank and the OECD which seeks to apply normative standards to define best
practices for well-run, responsive, and responsibly administered public sector
entities. As stated by Weiland (2006), “In practice, in the vast majority of cases
good governance is interpreted solely in terms of economic management, even
though the concept itself is far more comprehensive” (p. 8).
Donor countries, for instance, often require the inclusion of ethical notions
(combating corruption), rule of law principles, transparency of government decisions
and the fulfilment of legal obligations in the Good Governance conditionalities
linked to the execution of multilateral or bilateral agreements.
Such “good governance” initiatives by donor agencies often remain without much
success since government elites of beneficiary countries at times only pay lib service
to donor countries’ request for good governance especially those interest groups tied
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to external donors with strong interest to protect their own positions and benefits
from such connections. Such government elites try to keep their status quo rather
than help develop their own country to serve the common people. Such “lip service
good governance” actions end up being pro-forma reforms intended to promote
foreign donor’s objectives and values while at the same time trying to insulate their
own rent seeking positions from real governance reforms.
While rent-seeking government elites can be seen engaging in pro-forma
governance reforms, the opposite can also be observed when transition and
developing country officials try their best to improve their respective government
functioning and offer their citizens better services at more equitable basis. However,
in contrast to the preferred “good governance” priorities of many donor countries,
these well intended government civil servants are more intent on improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of their government machinery. They are for instance
more preoccupied with the basic functioning of their government and how to
improve government operations, service delivery, and internal decision making
rather than focus only on anti-corruption and ethical objectives.
Frederickson (2005) reviewed and evaluated the evolution and development of
the concept of governance in public administration, as treated in the available
academic literature. He examined the conceptual interrelation between different
concepts of public administration and broader notions of governance and good
governance. Frederickson observes:
The term “governance” is widespread in both public and private sectors, in
characterizing both global and local arrangements, and in reference to both
formal and informal norms and understandings. As a result, when authors
identify “governance” as important to achieving policy or organizational
objectives, it may be unclear whether the reference is to organizational structure,
administrative processes, managerial judgment, systems of incentives and rules,
administrative philosophies, or a combination of these elements. (p. 5)
On the issue of defining governance, Frederickson states that “…there are as
many definitions of the concept of governance as a synonym for public ad-
ministration, as there are applications” (p. 6). He adds that “…governance scholars
must settle on an agreed-upon definition, a definition broad enough to comprehend
the forces it presumes to explain but not so broad as to claim to explain everything”
(p. 16).
In search for a viable explanation of the concept of governance, Frederickson
suggests to observe it through the lenses of the international regime theory. Thus, a
government, and indeed the entire public sector, can be viewed as a set of implicit
and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actors’ expect-
ations converge in a particular issue-area. Governance analysis should focus on
cooperation among actors in any given issue area of public administration.
Moving beyond the governance and good governance debate, Farazmand (2004)
proposes an alternative concept called “sound governance” consisting of several
dimensions namely:
(1) process, (2) structure, (3) cognition and values, (4) constitution, (5)
organization and institution, (6) management and performance, (7) policy, (8)
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sector, (9) international and globalization forces and (10) ethics accountability
and transparence (p. 13)
Building on Farazmand’s sound governance concept, this article focuses on one
of the crucial governance mechanisms namely inter-ministerial policy coordination
(IMPC) which constitutes one of the most important governance mechanisms linking
and impacting three of Farazmand’s dimensions namely organization and institution,
management and performance and policy.
The importance of inter-ministerial policy coordination
The demands of participation in various international regimes make policy
coordination across government a key factor determining effective governance at
the national level. Governance mechanisms (i.e., standards, rules, and policies and
processes and procedures) apply to government functions both on a stand alone basis
and in the context of coordination among various public bodies.
Les Metcalfe (2004) discusses the growing trend of internationalization of
governance and how it should be reflected and incorporated in the national public
management reforms. He states that “There is an increasing need to create public
management capacities that will ensure that international governance is conducted
effectively” (p. 1). So far the processes of improving the capacity to cope with
international obligations have been lagging well behind the reforms focused on the
domestic performances of the government. He continues by observing that:
International governance is a multilevel process. It involves increasing
collaboration between organizations at different levels of government (p. 4).
How do national governments “get their acts together” in order to defend and
advance national interests? (p. 6)
Metcalfe (2004) emphasizes policy coordination as one of the key factors for
successful participation in international relations and comments: “Coordination
enables the whole to perform better than the sum of the parts or at least to prevent
disintegration and fragmentation” (p. 9).
Despite the fact that there are many definitions of coordination, depending on the
context in which it is be discussed, Metcalfe clarifies that the “…units of analysis are
national governments and the focus is on coordination among ministries where
coordination is an inter-organizational process” (p. 9).
To create a method for measuring and comparing coordination capacities, Metcalfe
constructed a Policy Coordination Scale. The scale was particularly designed to evaluate
the coordination capacities of the then 12 EU member states. It measures the
coordination capacity across nine coordination levels: independent decision making
by ministries, information exchange, consultations, avoiding divergences, seeking
consensus, conciliation and mediation, arbitration of inter-ministerial differences,
setting limits for ministries and establishing government priorities. The scale provides
ranking of countries based on their qualitative, rather than quantitative coordination
capacity.
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Peters (1998) provides a comprehensive study of the issue of coordination, as one
of the crucial aspects of governance and public administration. “If coordination is an
enduring problem of government, it now appears more central to the concerns of
many people in government than it has been in the recent past” (p. 9).
Peters examines the incentives that lead government institutions and public
servants to make efforts to work better horizontally, some of them being: reduction
of financial expenditures through optimization of government procedures, prolifer-
ation of cross-cutting issues that require simultaneous action by several institutions,
internationalization of many policy areas, and participation in the work of various
international fora.
What remains unclear is whether it would be more useful to isolate different
dimensions of coordination and to differentiate coordination issues from other
closely related questions of policy and administration. Peters hence raises several
dilemmas: Should we focus more attention on policy coordination or on the
coordination of administration? Should the coordination be imposed by the centre of
government or be developed and owned by the actual participants, i.e. institutions
that create or implement a specific policy measure? What are the models and
techniques for achieving coordination? Finally, the author raises the issue of the
relationship between coordination and accountability.
Accountability, at least in its ex post facto sense, depends upon the capacity of
politicians and the public to identify who is responsible for any failures in a
program, and complex coordination programs can reduce that capacity. (p. 23)
The quality and efficiency of governance and policy-making processes grow in
importance for the countries that are or intend to become members of the European
Union. Membership in the Union requires the enormous task of working on two
tracks that must be perfectly coordinated: creation and implementation of national
policies and participation in the complex EU policy-making process. To achieve this,
members and candidate-countries need to devote serious attention to putting in place
or improving the organizational, functional and human capacity of their governance
and policy-making mechanisms.
In 1992, the OECD and the EU launched the SIGMA Project as a joint initiative
whose main objective is to assist the improvement of governance and public
administration reforms in EU candidate countries.
Under the project, and with a purpose of monitoring and evaluating the progress
made by countries, SIGMA developed a set of baselines for six key areas of public
management: civil service, external audit, financial control, public expenditure
management systems, policy-making and coordination machinery and public
procurement management systems.1 The baselines reflect the standards of good
practice in the countries that are already members of the EU and are set to serve as a
1 Control and Management System Baselines for European Union Membership (OECD SIGMA 1999),
SIGMA Project (p. 1)
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tool for conducting assessment of central management and control systems in the
observed countries, particularly ones in various stages of EU integration.
IMPC in ECE and SEE countries
Countries covered in this section are classified into two categories, East Central
European (ECE) and Southeast European (SEE) using criteria that are more
political than geographical in nature. The main common characteristic for all of
them was that up to 1990, they all belonged to the so-called “communist block”
and as a consequence had regimes that lacked basic democracy and market
principles.







Latvia Bosnia and Herzegovina
Lithuania Serbia and Montenegro
During the first half of the 1990s, the former communist countries split into two
categories and, from than on developed with significantly different pace. The eight
countries of East Central Europe, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania achieved impressive success in the
speed and quality of their economic and political reforms. Their progress resulted in
EU membership that all of them obtained in May 2004.
The second group, known as SEE countries comprises Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Serbia andMontenegro.2 Most
of these countries had very turbulent first transition years. Turbulences varied from
severe political instabilities to devastating wars. Such political turbulence seriously
hampered the development of viable democracy and market institutions in the region.
Progress made in the SEE countries mostly depended on their internal strength
and capacity to overcome the obstacles. As of 2007, SEE countries have had varying
degrees of success in their effort to reform their economic and political legal
frameworks, as well as in their efforts to improve the efficiency of their
governmental institutions. As a result, they are in different stages of EU integration:
Bulgaria and Romania are members of the EU, Croatia started negotiations for
membership, Macedonia obtained a candidate status for membership, Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro joined the process for stabilization and
association. Moldova does not participate in the EU integration processes and Serbia
still lags behind due to internal political problems.
2 Although now members of the EU (since 1 January 2007), Bulgaria and Romania were part of all
analyses and reports on governance and public administration reforms prepared for this part of Europe
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Development of governance mechanisms in ECE and SEE countries
The ability of ECE and SEE countries to overcome the problems of the initial
transition years is directly reflected in their varying degrees of success in developing
stable and efficient governing mechanisms. As a group, ECE countries were
relatively more successful than the SEE countries in creating new and reforming
their existing government policies and institutions. General review of political
systems established in the observed countries shows that both ECE and SEE
countries developed parliamentary systems after the fall of communism, with the
Parliament as the main legislative body and a Cabinet of Ministers led by Prime
Minister as the central executive body, the exception being some SEE countries with
strong presidential regimes like Serbia.
Ben-Gera (2004) identifies the main challenges that the countries of ECE and
SEE faced and had to deal with immediately after their coming into being
(Table 1):
There is an almost infinite variety of subject matters concerning government,
from human rights to economic development, from environment to transport,
education, agriculture, police, and pensions. Government and administration
deal with the immediate and the long-term, values of individuals and aspirations
of collectives, local and global issues, citizens, groups, religions, ethnic
minorities, nations and the international community. (p. 12)
Policy-makers had to deal with these aspects within the context of their
political and economic transition and had to do this quickly in order to respond to
the aspiration of their citizens who were anxious to “catch up” with the West,
while at the same time maintaining and building their own unique cultures and
institutions.













Albania 35.9 49.8 27.4 45.0 21.3 27.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 33.5 43.5 24.5 31.7 30.4 46.3
Bulgaria 62.2 65.7 50.9 69.3 48.8 55.2
Croatia 67.5 61.4 58.0 65.3 53.6 59.1
Czech Republic 76.6 77.8 68.4 79.2 70.0 68.0
Estonia 82.8 84.1 67.5 91.1 75.4 79.8
Hungary 75.1 85.0 71.2 82.7 69.6 70.4
Latvia 73.2 72.0 74.1 78.7 61.4 66.0
Lithuania 76.1 73.4 76.9 83.2 63.8 64.0
Macedonia 47.4 48.3 19.3 48.5 43.5 40.4
Poland 71.3 83.6 54.2 72.3 59.9 61.1
Romania 56.9 56.5 46.2 58.4 45.4 51.7
Serbia and Montenegro 45.5 50.2 20.8 32.2 24.6 39.4
Slovak Republic 77.0 83.1 67.9 85.1 60.9 68.5
Slovenia 78.5 84.5 80.7 74.8 74.4 80.3
Table prepared by authors. Data source: Kaufman et al. (2006) “Governance Matters: Governance
Indicators for 1996–2005”, World Bank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/mc_indicator.asp
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Moreover, they had to do it within a democratic political setting which
differed substantially from the rigid form of governance of the previous
communist regime (Saner and Yiu 1996). The above description, although not
exhaustive, gives an idea of the complex challenges that confronted the govern-
ments of these countries; and they still continue to confront them today. The
evolution of governing mechanisms that took decades in Western Europe to emerge
had to be developed virtually overnight in EU transition countries in order to avoid
severe policy deadlocks and to provide suitable conditions for the required
economic and political developments.
The success of managing the policy-making and implementation processes in
ECE and SEE countries depends on their ability to simultaneously manage the
multiplicity of issues and juggle between various interests, individual and collective,
local and international. The large number of tasks ranging in character from simple
to complex requires the establishment of sophisticated organizational structures that
are able to combine various governmental entities, such as ministries, departments,
agencies, commissions, etc. To effectively cope with the activities of all these
administrative bodies, ECE/SEE governments had to develop sound and constructive
coordination mechanisms that were expected to result in an effective and efficient
decision-making process.
The evolution of the governing mechanisms in the EU transition countries was
strongly influenced and affected by their individual aspirations to join the European
Union. The processes of complying with the EU acquis communautaire and of
conducting and successfully completing the membership negotiations required that
enormous efforts be put into the creation of new and the strengthening the capacity
of existing institutions.
In this context, one of the crucial issues was the functioning of the cabinets of
ministers, since they happen to be the ultimate decision and policy-making entities.
Like in any other democratic country, their success was dependent on the ability to
find an equilibrium between the principles of “representativeness” and “efficiency”
(Blondel and Malova 2005) In other words, the decision-making in the cabinets had
to reconcile various political interests represented by the coalition parties, interests of
different ministries and institutions, and yet be efficient and effective.
The ability to the making of collective and consensual decisions that are also
efficient is dependent of three issues. First and foremost, it is necessary to have
appropriate instruments of coordination, and their development is not an easy task.
Second, is the development of substantive and procedural capacities for the planning
and execution of long-term strategic objectives. Finally, it is imperative that all of the
interested sectors, i.e., business, public and academic, are included in the policy-
making process.
During the 16 years following the fall of communism, the ECE countries, for
some of the reasons mentioned above, were much more successful in grasping the
concepts of coherent and efficient policy-making than the SEE countries. The
latter, although more or less having all institutions and mechanisms in place, still
struggle to achieve the desired results. The success of the individual countries
from the two groups can be seen in the results of governance performance in six
areas represented by the World Bank Governance Indicators for 2005. As
discussed earlier, the numbers support the statements that ECE countries are more
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successful in creating and strengthening governing mechanisms and institutions
than the SEE countries.
The indicator that is most relevant in describing the functioning of the policy-
making bodies and the coordination of their activities is the one on Government
Effectiveness, selectively demonstrated in the following chart:
Source: Kaufman, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M (2006) “Governance Matters:
Governance Indicators for 1996-2005”, World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/kkz2005/mc_indicator.asp
The case of Macedonia
Macedonia may be a good example to demonstrate the typical governance challenges
in Southeast European countries. The capacity of Macedonian institutions to formulate
and implement policies in virtually all areas of the society is still fairly weak.
In their study “Understanding Reform in Macedonia” (2004), Petkovski and
Bishev make an attempt to identify some of the reasons for the underperformance of
governing institutions in Macedonia:
During transition, Macedonia has not been successful in creating efficient
institutions, due to several reasons. Firstly, as a newly independent state, it had
to build many basic institutions virtually from “scratch”. Secondly, it has
traditionally been an underdeveloped region. Therefore, it is logical that its
inhabitants do not possess any “institutional memory” on market based
institutions (for example stock exchanges) which existed in more developed
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parts of Yugoslavia and in advanced transitional economies between the two
world wars. Thirdly, to date, Macedonian policy makers have paid relatively
little attention to the importance of the institution building process, which is
typical for less successful transition strategies. (p. 19)
In view of the above comments it is not surprising that Macedonia did very
poorly in policy developments during the first decade of its independence which
resulted, among other things, in a significant foreign trade imbalance and a high
level of unemployment. It was the beginning of the new century that brought the first
signs of improvement. Policy-making slowly began to improve under the pressure of
the need to comply with several extremely important international initiatives, namely
the accession to the World Trade Organization, the reforms necessary for NATO
membership, and above all, the process of integration with the European Union.
However, the impression is that, instead of being recognized by the policy-makers
as the only way towards progress in the country, most of the improvements in the
decision-making process were introduced as means to fulfil specific international
requirements. It would be unfair to state that this was done intentionally; it was
much more a result of the inability of both the politicians and the bureaucrats to
understand the importance of the principles of governance and the need for
comprehensive, coherent and competent processes of policy-making.
Nevertheless, in an effort to demonstrate progress in the management of multiple
policy issues in a comprehensive, organizationally sound and competent manner, the
governance mechanism of Macedonia has recently seen some improvements. The
Cabinet of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising all ministers, has
become the main decision-making body. There is a General Secretariat that deals
with all organizational, administrative and logistic issues in support of the decisions
of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. Last but not least a net of committees has
been established in various areas and at various government levels to meet the needs
for policy coordination.
With regard to the latter, the Macedonian government institutions are increasingly
more willing to establish coordination bodies, either working groups or committees, in
order to increase the effectiveness of mutual consultations and information-sharing or
reconciliation activities. For instance, the very complex and organizationally
complicated process of accession to the World Trade Organization was successfully
handled by two such multi-agency bodies established at different decision-making
levels: the Coordinative Body of Experts and the Coordinative Body of Ministers.
After Macedonia became aWTOmember in 2003, the two bodies continued to play an
important coordination role in the elaboration of foreign trade policy.
However, despite all legal requirements in place, the system still has significant
shortcomings that translate into fragmented and sometimes contradictory policy
decisions, weak support mechanisms for informed decision-making, unsatisfactory
institutional capacities for policy implementation, staffing changes which result in
discontinuity due to election cycles, etc. In the light of the upcoming negotiations for
EU membership, and if it wants to complete them in a timely and competent manner,
Macedonia will have to try harder to improve its governance procedures. It is perhaps
even more important for Macedonia to change its existing thinking on institutional and
political issues in order to understand the needs of proper governance better.
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Government governance in Central Asia
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Central Asian republics3 faced three
different issues of transition: economic shock, transformation to market based
economy and political transition (Linn 2002). All republics have chosen their own
ways to reform their countries and this has had an impact on their current
economical, political and social situations.
The basic socio-economic indicators of the Central Asian countries are presented
below. The leader in the region, according to the size of GDP per capita, is
Kazakhstan with its abundant mineral resources. GDP per capita in Turkmenistan,
with its huge gas resources, is also relatively high. The level of poverty is mirrored
by the patterns of GDP per capita, and the poorest countries in the region are
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan4.
Socioeconomic indicators of the Central Asian Republics5
GDP per
capita, PPP
Poverty headcount ratio at $2.15 a





Kyrgyzstan 1935 70 5 27
Kazakhstan 7440 21 15 6
Tajikistan 1202 74 6 46
Turkmenistan 5860 44 5 10
Uzbekistan 1869 47 26 62
Source: World Development Indicators 2006
Geographically the region is also very diverse, ranging from deserts, steppes with
huge resources of oil and gas in some countries to high mountains and abundant
water resources in others. In addition, Central Asian countries have heterogeneous
populations which vary in size and population density.
Reforms in the region also have varied during the transition period. The most
active reformers are Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by Tajikistan, while
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan lag behind with the former administrative-command
system of economy still very much in place (EBRD 2005).
In spite of the differences in territory, population, economic wealth and the
progress of reforms, all countries continue to be influenced by their common Soviet
legacy. They also have many common problems, such as an adequate access to the
world markets, environmental issues, deteriorating social systems, difficult political
situations and problems of governance (UNDP 2005).
Governance indicators in the Central Asian Region
The issues of governance have become the key concerns of Central Asian
governments and international organizations helping them ever since the countries
were deemed to have reached relative macroeconomic stabilization. According to
4 Civil war in Tajikistan severely affected economic and social performance of the country
5 GDP per capita is given for 2004, poverty headcount for 2003, except Turkmenistan–1998. Population
and population density are presented for 2005.
3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
Government Governance (GG) and Inter-Ministerial Policy Coordination… 225
World Bank data on governance indicators, only Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were
able to move their governance6 rating from what it was in 1996 to a higher percentile
rank in 2005.7. The situations in Kyrgyzstan along with Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan have worsened (see the Figs. 1 and 2). For comparison, average ranks
of the tenth largest (according to GDP) OECD countries are also presented.8
In general, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have ranked in the tenth lowest
percentile in 2005 thereby signaling significant problems with governance. The
situation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is also far from satisfactory in
spite of some improvements in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
Analysis of government effectiveness9, as one of the governance pillars, shows a































Fig. 1 Average percentile, according to governance indicators in 1996 and 2005
6 Governance indicator consists of 6 sub-indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
Database with indicators for separate countries is available online including absolute values and countries’
ranks (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/mc_indicator.asp). For more details see Kaufmann
et al. (2006), “Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005 (p. 4).
7 Percentile rank (0–100) indicates the percentage of countries that rank below the selected country.
8 These countries include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, UK, and
USA.
9 Government effectiveness measures the quality of government services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of government’s commitment to such policies. Kaufmann et al. (2006),
“Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005 (p. 4).
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performers in this field, but government effectiveness in Kyrgyzstan decreased
significantly since 1996, while Kazakhstan moved from 12.4th percentile in 1996 to
28.5th percentile in 2005.
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan nothing has changed and they stay in the lowest
10th percentile in government effectiveness. Tajikistan after the conclusion of the
civil war moved from 1.4th (only 1.4% of countries in the world were in a worse
situation) percentile in 1996 to 12.4th percentile in 2005.
Analysis of the governance indicators in Central Asian region reveals that the
situation is very different among the respective countries. There are leaders and there
are countries that lag much behind. Yet it is possible to discern general issues that are
common to them all.
Common issues with governance effectiveness in the Central Asian Region
The first common feature is that at their independence all of the countries inherited
the old Soviet problems related to the establishment of new institutions. As it was
mentioned above, all countries chose their own individual development paths. The
same can be said about the setting up of structures, functions and mechanisms of
executive power. However, in all countries in the region the role of president turned
out to be superior to the other institution. Strong presidentialism had its roots in the
Soviet system and in the role the first secretaries of the Communist Parties of the



























Fig. 2 Average percentile, according to government effectiveness in 1996 and 2005
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Presidential elections were held in all Central Asian countries at the beginning of
independence. Later all changes in the Constitutions, as well as the supporting
elections and referendums, strengthened and consolidated the powers of the heads of
state. By 1996 all Central Asian states have had super-presidential systems with the
presidents controlling all political decisions and maintaining absolute power (UNDP
2005). In the most hypertrophied form this situation took place in Turkmenistan,
where the late President Turkmen Bashi became a lifetime president. The supremacy
of the presidential office may not be as evident in other Central Asian countries, with
the exception of Kyrgyzstan but there too the political system has been restructured
in such a way that no serious contenders for presidency remain. They are either in
prison or in exile.
The second common feature of all republics in Central Asia is centralization of
power in the center. Even Kyrgyzstan, where substantial decentralization reforms
have taken place, still can not be considered a decentralized country because local
self-governance units are not provided adequate financial resources and there is no
clear division of responsibilities between the center and local bodies.
The third common feature is in the role of clans and elites, based on family,
kinship, business and other types of relationships. These groups have substantial
influence on policy decisions inside the countries. They may put significant
obstacles in the way to reforms when they feel that the particular reforms threaten
their positions.
There are also common issues in the effectiveness of public administration and
civil service which are mainly based on the legacy of the Soviet command-
administrative system (UNDP 2006). They are:
1. Overstaffed and underpaid civil service with complete absence of managerial
skills and very often unqualified. There is no merit-based competitive
recruitment of civil servants.
2. Lack of horizontal coordination and reliance only on vertical decision-making
with the dominant role played by the president’s administration;
3. Strong resistance to change in the top-level groups which have captured the
resources and enjoy monopoly positions. They are reluctant to introduce any
changes which may endanger or weaken their positions.
4. Almost all countries suffer either from lack of legislation aimed at establishing
an efficient system of civil service or from poor implementation of laws.
5. Lack of mechanisms to enforce accountability of public officials for improper
implementation of their functions. This leads to inefficiency in government and
more so to corruption.
Again, as in the case of economic reforms, the scope and extent of problems varies
significantly among the Central Asian countries. For instance, Kazakhstan has made
significant progress in setting up a stable professional civil service system. Appropriate
legislation has been enacted and sound institutional mechanisms to manage the system
have been established (World Bank 2005a). It is important to mention that the success
of the reforms in Kazakhstan was partially based on favorable economic conditions
based on the exploitation of significant mineral resources.
The situation in other countries is not as optimistic. For example, Tajikistan has to
establish all institutions and the system of public administration literally from the
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bottom up. The reforms of public administration and civil service are so far of a
“stop and go” nature with limited real change (World Bank 2005).
In Uzbekistan problems with public administration are closely related to the
general problems with authoritarianism. According to Ergashev (2003: 5), there is
no unified and systematic normative basis for the functioning of executive bodies,
which is further aggravated by the existence of powerful internal hierarchies
(formal and informal). There are many different interdepartmental commissions in
Uzbekistan. Their functions duplicate the functions of ministers, agencies etc. The
role and authority of different executive bodies are not clearly defined and the
decision making process is not transparent. An additional problem is the deep
intrusion of a bloated public administration into the economy. This leads to a
predatory administration where state power and business are closely interrelated
and interdependent.
The leader in economic reforms and liberalization of the economy—Kyrgyzstan—
also faces problems with governance and the effectiveness of government in spite of
all reforms in this sphere. During recent years numerous efforts, supported and
promoted by international donors, have been made to establish new institutions to
improve the situation with the civil service. A law “On the Civil Service” has been
enacted. A Civil Service Agency has been established to oversee implementation of
the Law “On Declaration and Publication of Income and Assets of Political and High
Civil Service Officials and Their Close Relatives”. Functional reviews of most
ministries have been undertaken to start reorganization and restructuring.
In spite of all these efforts, the situation has not improved. All attempts to
reorganize and restructure the existing executive bodies has not been successful. The
main problem is in implementation of the existing laws and lack of political will for
real change. In addition, the issue of incentives and of a merit-based recruitment,
which is crucial for the performance of public service, has not been solved yet. This
negatively affects prestige of public administration and discourages competent and
skilful employees who leave in growing numbers.
The most difficult situation among Central Asian countries is in Turkmenistan
where all power was concentrated in one person—President Turkmen Bashi who
passed away in 2007. Election of the new president may change the situation
slightly, but only in the long run.
Summing up, governance of governments remains one of the most important
problems in the Central Asian republics. All countries in Central Asia still rely on
strictly hierarchal methods of governance with the concentration of power located
around the president and the presidential administration, while the quality and
capacity of public employees remains one of the main impediments to effective
governance. Only Kazakhstan has so far managed to reform the civil service. Other
countries still have low-paid, unqualified employees not recruited on the basis of
merit and competence which significantly limits the effectiveness of governments in
Central Asia.
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